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The Legality of Bank-Sponsored
Investment Services
In recent years, many commercial banks have expanded beyond
their traditional role of accepting time and demand deposits and mak-
ing commercial loans. They now engage not only in these traditional
activities but also in mortgage banking, travel services, data processing,
and leasing.' They also perform a variety of bank-sponsored invest-
ment services for small customers including automatic investment ser-
vices, dividend reinvestment plans, voluntary investment plans, indi-
vidual portfolio management services, and activities as advisers to in-
vestment companies.
2
Perceiving these activities as an encroachment upon their profes-
sional territory, brokers and investment companies have raised ques-
tions about their legality and regulation.3 Opponents have argued both
that these services violate the Glass-Steagall Act,4 and that, because of
the banks' exemptions from several provisions of the federal securities
laws, customers using banks do not receive adequate investor protec-
tion.5 A recent decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to issue a release asking for comments on this problem, 6 the re-
cent initiation of two lawsuits challenging the validity of these ser-
vices, 7 and the introduction of a bill in Congress that would subject
these activities to SEC regulation8 all indicate the importance of the
controversy.
1. See Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 BANKING L.J. 611, 611-12
(1974).
2. In its recent release asking for comments on the legality of bank-sponsored invest-
ment services, the SEC described the broad features of each of these plans. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 5491, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[
79,767, at 84,073-74 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 5491].
3. These questions have been raised most prominently in two recent complaints filed
by the New York Stock Exchange and the Investment Company Institute challenging the
legality of two of these services, automatic investment services and bank advisory activities
to investment companies. Automatic investment services are the subject of a complaint
filed in New York Stock Exch., Inc. and Inv. Co. Institute v. Smith, Civil No. 1405 (D.D.C.,
filed Sept. 24, 1974), [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f[ 94,798 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as NYSE case]; bank advisory activities are the subject of a complaint filed in In-
vestment Co. Institute v. Board of Governors of the Fed'l Reserve Sys., Civil Action No.
697 (D.D.C., filed May 8, 1974), [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 94,540
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Investment Co. case].
4. See, e.g., Complaint, NYSE case, supra note 3, at 96,655-58.
5. See, e.g., id. at 96,657-58.
6. Release No. 5491, supra note 2.
7. See note 3 supra.
8. S. 2707, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), would subject automatic investment services to
SEC jurisdiction and all the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970).
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This Note examines the effect of bank-sponsored investment services
on customers and on the securities and capital markets, their legality
under the Glass-Steagall Act, and whether customers using the services
obtain satisfactory investor protection. It concludes that these services
are legally provided under current law, that they are beneficial in at-
tracting small investors and capital to the market, and that because
banking regulations provide adequate protection for investors, the SEC
should not attempt to regulate bank-sponsored investment services.
I. Description of the Services
A. Automatic Investment Services (AIS)
AIS allows a bank's checking account customers to invest in com-
mon stock through automatic monthly deductions from their accounts.
Although only persons maintaining a checking account with the bank
may use this service, the account may be opened simultaneously with
participation in AIS.9 Banks generally have limited investors' selec-
tions to common stock of the 25 corporations having the largest cap-
italization on Standard Sc Poor's 425 Industrial Index, 10 though no
law or regulation requires this selection method.
The plan's purchasing mechanism is intended to reduce brokerage
costs for small investors by pooling their purchases. The monthly de-
ductions of purchasers who have selected a particular stock are pooled,
and at least once a month the bank establishes a cutoff date and there-
after purchases as much stock as the pooled funds will buy.11 The
period between the cutoff date and the date of purchase-known as
the "acquisition interval"-generally does not exceed 30 days. 12 Each
participant pays his proportionate share of the applicable brokerage
charges and a monthly service charge which has averaged the lesser
of five percent of the monthly deduction from his account or $2 per
stock designated for purchase.' 3
9. See Release No. 5491, supra note 2, at 84,073.
10. Id. The banks believe that in forming the AIS list in this "mechanical" manner
they are not recommending any securities and are therefore acting only as agents, not
investment managers. See Investment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. -" 79,411, at 83,185 (SEC). The truth of this contention bears on the question of
whether banks should be subject to the suitability rule. See pp. 1500-02 infra.
11. Release No. 5491, supra note 2, at 84,073; Investment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FD. SEC. L. REP. ir 79,411, at 83,183 (SEC).
12. Investment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FrD. SEC. L. REP. f 79,411,
at 83,183 (SEC).
13. Id.; Release No. 5491, supra note 2, at 84,073.
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B. Dividend Reinvestment Plans (DRP)
DRP's rationale is to provide an economical and convenient method
by which the small investor can invest modest sums on a regular basis.
Under this plan, the bank acts as agent for a company's participating
shareholders in receiving dividends and investing them in additional
shares of the company's common stock. Some plans permit additional
cash contributions for stock purchase, and some provide for application
of interest or dividends on other securities of the corporation to this
purchase.' 4 Within 30 days after receipt by the bank, the dividends
are combined and used to purchase the maximum possible amount of
stock in the particular company.' 5 Service fees of the bank and broker-
age commissions are deducted from the amounts available for invest-
ment; these costs have averaged five percent of the amount invested.' 6
A customer may terminate participation in the plan at any time, and
upon termination he may either receive the certificates for the full
shares in his account or direct the bank to sell his shares.
17
C. Individual Portfolio Management Services (1PMS)
IPMS provides investment advice on an individual basis to bank
customers who have only moderate amounts of investable resources,
which generally must be at least $10,000.1 The bank sends a list of
recommended stocks to the customer. If the customer agrees with some
of the recommendations, he mails his selections to a broker, who then
executes the transaction. 19 The typical service charges the customer
a fixed rate.2
0
14. Release No. 5491, supra note 2, at 84,073.
15. The SEC requires this condition in order for the dividend reinvestment plan to
avoid the creation of a separate security that must be registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to 80a-52 (1970). Lucky Stores, Inc., [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,903, at 84,315-16 (SEC 1974).
16. There is no requirement as to the amount of the service fee, but five percent is
an approximation of what a typical plan will charge. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank,
[1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [ 78,368, at 80,840 (SEC 1972).
17. Id. The SEC requires that shareholders may terminate participation at any time
for DRP to avoid registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Lucky Stores,
Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. fT 79,903, at 84,315-16 (SEC 1974). Upon
termination the shareholder receives reimbursement for any fractional shares in cash from
the bank. Id.
18. Release No. 5491, supra note 2, at 84,074; American Bankers Association Response
to SEC Inquiry Concerning Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, Aug. 9, 1974, at 11 (on
file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Bankers Ass'n Response].
19. See SEC, SMALL ACCOUNT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR CLEARER POLICIES AND GUIDELINES 9-11 (CCH FED. SEC. L. REPORTS No. 465, Feb. 6,
1973).
20. Id. at 13.
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D. Voluntary Investment Plans (VIP)
Except for the fact that in VIP a broker draws up the list of securi-
ties, VIP and AIS operate similarly. After preparing a list of some
30 securities, a participating broker-dealer refers interested custom-
ers to a bank. The bank offers these customers a monthly purchase
program for whichever stocks the customer selects from the broker's
original list. The bank handles the customer's funds, and charges him
four to five percent of the total amount invested. One-fourth of this
fee then goes to the broker-dealer.
21
E. Bank Advisory Services to Investment Companies
Pursuant to regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board,'2 2 sev-
eral banks now act as investment advisers to closed-end and open-end
investment companies, providing the same services that fiduciaries
and financial advisers have traditionally performed. Their primary
function is to provide the investment companies with securities in-
vestment advice.23
II. Effects of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services on
Investors and on the Capital Market System
A. The Effect on Investors
Over the last five years the market has suffered a large decline in di-
rect public participation in stock trading.24 The tight money market
and the prolonged skid in the Dow-Jones average help to explain the
decline of the private investor.2 5 But relatively high commission charges
and the decision of many investment houses to direct their attention
to large institutional investors have also contributed to his disap-
pearance. Brokerage rates have increased dramatically over the last five
years. In 1970 it cost $21 to buy 100 shares of a $20 stock.20 As of June
21. This plan is described in Release No. 5491, supra note 2, at 84,073-74.
22. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5) (1974).
23. The features of this service are described in Release No. 5491, supra note 2, at
84,074; Investment Co. case, supra note 3.
24. In 1973, individual private investors bought and sold nearly 20 percent less stock
on national exchanges than in 1968, precipitating a drop of $20 billion in traded assets.
In 1961, individual investors accounted for 61 percent of all dollar trading volume on the
New York Stock Exchange; in 1973, they accounted for only 30 percent, while institutions
did 70 percent of the trading. Rolo, The Case of the Vanishing Investor, N.Y. Times,
June 9, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 14.
25. See Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate Control,
42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 761, 769 (1974).
26. Metz, Market Place: Fee Rises with Trading Action, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1974, at
40, col. 3.
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2, 1975, it costs $45.27 Many firms have tried to counter this trend
by offering special plans with discounts to small investors. 2s These
plans, however, have often actually resulted in higher commissions,
and, in any case, are not geared to attracting new investors20 The May
1, 1975 move from fixed commissions to competitive rates has resulted
in slightly higher fees for small investors.30
Bank-sponsored investment services can play a vital role in attracting
many small investors who would not otherwise enter or reenter the
marketplace to invest in equity securities. The structure of the services
itself indicates that they are geared to small investors, whereas the
large brokerage houses are heavily oriented toward institutional in-
vestors. 31 Customers are likely to be attracted to a service which is
part of a larger financial institution offering other commercial services
since small investors generally find it more convenient to transact all
their business at one institution rather than to do some business
with a broker, some with a bank, and a portion with an investment
company.32 Moreover, the bank is an institution with which almost
everyone has an existing business relationship. The savings in trans-
actional costs through these services is another attractive feature for
small investors. On a $500 purchase, for example, the AIS charge is
$7.00, whereas the average brokerage charge is $12.25. 33
27. Interview with John Kelly, Vice President for Public Relations, Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., June 2, 1975 (telephone).
28. See Metz, Market Place: 'Negotiations' in Small Trades, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1974,
at 60, col. 2; Vartan, Wall Street Baits a Hook, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1974, § 3, at 1, col.
7; Vartan, Market Place: Rivals Assess Merrill's Plan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1974, at 56,
col. 2.
29. Bache & Co., for example, has a plan in which on transactions of $1,600 to $2,000
a customer may receive a discount but on purchases worth less than $1,600 he may
actually pay more than he normally would. Metz, Market Place: 'Negotiations' in Small
Trades, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1974, at 60, col. 3. Even when a customer has joined the
plans, he often gains little in the current inactive market because the plans contemplate
purchases or sales "at the market," usually at the opening price of the day. What the
customer gives up in buying "at the market" is his right to stipulate a particular price
he will pay for shares on a purchase, or accept for his shares on a sale. If a customer
receives a 25 percent commission rate discount on a purchase of 100 shares at $20 per
share, he would save S10.45. However, when a customer buys "at the market" he pays
the asked price. In a bear market, the chances are that the bid price on this stock was at
least a quarter of a point less than what he paid. Even if it were only one-eighth of a
point less, he would save S2.05 if he buys at the bid price as compared with what he paid
under the special plan. Metz, Market Place: New Fee Plan Has Problems, N.Y. Times,
May 24, 1974, at 44, col. 3.
30. Cole, Rate War Rages Among Brokers, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
31. The orientation of brokerage firms toward accommodating large institutions and
ignoring small investors has been posited as one reason for the latter's flight from the
securities market. See, e.g., Cobleigh, The Flight and Plight of the Small Investor, 216
Cold. & FINAN. CHRON. 1852 (1972).
32. Surveys conducted by banks of AIS participants indicate that the investors are
attracted to the service because of its convenience and the fact that small amounts can be
invested. Bankers Ass'n Response, supra note 18, at 24.
33. Cole, Wall Street's 'Negotiated Rates' Plans Start Today, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1,
1974, at 49, col. 3. The brokerage charge is from Merrill Lynch's Sharebuilder Plan, and
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Complete statistics on these services are still lacking, but the avail-
able data do indicate that they are attracting new investors to the stock
market. Over half the customers in automatic investment services
have never before purchased common stock.34 Participants in indi-
vidual portfolio management services, on the other hand, are more
experienced, sophisticated investors who are attracted to the conven-
ient, low-cost services that banks offer.3 Although most of these in-
vestors have participated in the stock market before,36 a service that
they are happy with will induce them to remain in the market and
encourage them to increase their investments. Dividend reinvestment
plans, by definition, do not attract new investors since participants
must already own shares in the issuing company, but they may attract
new investments. Currently there are no data on the impact of volun-
tary investment plans,37 but because of their similarity to AIS it is
likely that they will attract new investors to the market.
At present, the total number of investors who are using bank-spon-
sored services is small, although the services have shown recent gains,
and one service, DRP, has experienced significant popularity. 3 Uncer-
tainty over the legality of these services and inertia in establishing
new investment programs might well explain the generally slow growth.
As these problems are resolved, though, the number of investors should
increase, and to the extent that any program is capable of luring the
small investor to the market, bank-sponsored investment services are
likely to play a significant role. That is, if the crucial factor in in-
ducing a number of persons to invest in securities is the lower com-
mission rates and greater convenience that bank-sponsored investment
services offer, the services are important because they enhance the
public's ability to use their investable resources as they desire.
To a large extent, economic progress depends on sufficient capital
is accurate as of June 2, 1975. Interview with John Kelly, supra note 27. AIS rates have
remained stable during the last 15 months. Interview with an anonymous clerk in the
Chase Manhattan Bank department in charge of AIS, June 2, 1975 (telephone).
34. Bankers Ass'n Response, supra note 18, at 22-23.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id. at 30-31.
37. The Bankers Ass'n Response, supra note 18, at 21, does not contain statistics on
the characteristics of VIP participants.
38. Of the 100 largest United States corporations, 39 have dividend reinvestment plans,
with an average of nine percent of the shareholders of each company participating. Id.
at 20. One bank has reported that 50 percent of DRP's participants own less than 100
shares of the issuing company's stock, and another bank has reported the average share-
holding of the participants as between 75 and 95 shares. Id. Fifty-six percent of AIS in-
vestors are in the $12,000 to S25,000 income range, and 24 percent of the investors are in
the $25,000 and over range. Id. at 23. Total participation in AIS is approximately 15,000.
Id. at 24. The numbers of investors currently participating in VIP and IPMS are very
small, and specific figures are not yet available. Id. at 21, 31.
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formation. 39 But it is likely that capital accumulation in the next
decade will be insufficient to meet the needs of America's various
industrial sectors.40 Because bank-sponsored investment services will at-
tract new investors to the market, they should play an important role
in increasing the amount of capital available to corporations. 4
1
B. The Effect on Capital Markets
Countering institutionalization. A major issue in evaluating the im-
pact of these services is whether they will result in the increased in-
stitutionalization of capital markets, the assumption being that owner-
ship dominance by a narrow ring of institutions is a harmful trend
that should be discouraged .42 If institutionalization is taken to mean
the capacity to effect block trades, the services may increase institu-
tionalization, at least to the extent that AIS, DRP, and VIP develop
more rapidly than IPMS, since the banks purchase stock for customers
in large, single transactions. This type of institutionalization may
hamper market liquidity,4 3 for decisions to buy or sell a given stock
could drastically change its value if enough stock is changing hands in
a single block transaction.
A broader meaning often given to institutionalization, though, con-
39. See Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1975, at 22, col. 1.
40. The New York Stock Exchange estimates that in the next decade there will be a
capital shortfall of 13 percent of capital needs, or $650 billion. Id.
41. Whether the services will play this role depends on the resolution of an empirical
question for which, at present, there are no data: as to those investors who would not
otherwise have invested in the market if these services did not exist, what would they
have done with their money? If they would have kept their money in intermediaries
like savings deposits which themselves invested in the capital market (though not neces-
sarily in equities), there would be no difference in the amount of capital furnished to
corporations, though the form of capital contributions (stock or debt) and the identity
of the corporate recipients might be different. Bank-sponsored investment services will
have their most important impact if they cause changes in the net impact of capital con-
tributed to corporations, as by changing people's savings-income ratios.
42. A number of financial writers contend that the recent dominance of institutions
in the stock market has been harmful. They assert that because institutions tend to con-
centrate their purchases in a relatively select group of stocks, all other companies find it
difficult to raise money by stock issues; that dominance by a few institutions has destroyed
all vestiges of "democracy" in the marketplace by which the price of a stock is determined
by the "votes" or purchases of a large number of individuals; that liquidity, the ability
to buy or sell substantial amounts of stock at prices not too far removed from the
prevailing quotations, has also diminished; and that institutions exercise ownership rights
such as voting the shares of their customers. See, e.g., Hearings on Financial Markets
Before the Subcoinn. on Financial Markets of the Sen. Comin. on Finance, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. I, at 178 (1973) (statement of C.V. Wood, Jr., President, McCulloch Oil
Corp.); Loomis, Hon the Terrible Two-Tier Market Caine to Wall Street, FORTUNE, July
1973, at 82; Rolo, The Case of the Vanishing Investor, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1974, § 6
(Magazine), at 48, 52, 58; BusINEss WEEK, June 2, 1973, at 58; Solomon, Institutional In-
vestors, supra note 25, at 776-79; U.S. Treas. Dep't, Public Policy for American Capital
Markets, BNA 1974 SEc. REc. L. REP. No. 239, at D-l, D-12-14 (prepared by James H.
Lorie).
43. See note 42 supra.
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templates the harmful effects resulting from the discretionary manage-
ment authority of institutions to make securities transactions and to
exercise other ownership rights. 44 Many financial writers have argued
that mutual funds have fostered a form of institutionalization in which
investment companies possess all the attributes of stock ownership and
the individuals participating in the funds have little influence in mar-
ket decisions.
45
Individuals purchasing securities through bank-sponsored invest-
ment services will exercise greater ownership rights. Except for the
banks' ability to control the exact timing of purchases, the services'
participants have freedom to buy and sell stock as individuals when-
ever they desire. The participants may request the bank to deliver
their shares to them, in which case they would clearly have the normal
ownership rights of voting their individual shares and of receiving
annual reports and other shareholder information. If customers choose
to let the bank hold their shares, the bank requests voting instructions
from each customer, votes shares only upon the request of each cus-
tomer, and arranges to have each customer receive appropriate share-
holder information.
46
Some financial analysts have stated that because institutions tend
to concentrate their purchases in a small number of stocks, a "two-
tier" market has developed in which a few stocks favored by institu-
tions sell at artificially high price-earnings ratios while all other com-
panies experience little demand for their stocks and have great diffi-
culty raising capital.47 Because bank-sponsored investment services
presently are concentrating on a select group of large corporations,
according to this theory they may exacerbate the two-tier market.
Several recent studies of the market, however, suggest that institu-
tional block purchases are not responsible for the two-tier market,
and that this phenomenon is in any event fading. 4s Furthermore, it
is possible that banks may expand the list of available securities once
they realize that they probably cannot avoid suitability requirements
44. The critics of institutional participation in the stock market focus on the effects
of their participation rather than on the fact that they effect block trades. See note 42
supra.
45. See note 42 supra.
46. See Lucky Stores, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,903, at
84,316 (SEC 1974); Investment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. f 79,411, at 83,183 (SEC).
47. See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 42; Note, The Institutional Investor Disclosure Act:
An Analysis of the Consumer Benefits, 83 YALE L.J. 1271, 1272 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Institutional Investor Disclosure Act].
48. See Note, Institutional Investor Disclosure Act, supra note 47, at 1272 nn.7, 9.
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by offering only a limited number of stocks in their programs. 40 This
development would ensure that bank-sponsored investment services do
not contribute to a pattern of selective investments in a small number
of securities.
Improving competition. Some arguments by brokers and investment
companies against bank-sponsored investment services rest on a con-
cern that efficient banking services may attract a portion of the in-
vesting public away from traditional investment agents or that com-
petition between banks and brokers may cause brokers financial hard-
ships. 0 Such arguments, however, do not comport with prevailing eco-
nomic theory or traditional government economic policy. Orthodox
economic theory maintains that the general welfare may best be served
in a given service or mode of production by free competition that
promises lower costs and increased efficiency. Special protection given
to one competing group or the denial of entry into the competitive
marketplace to another group leads only to a decline in innovation,
an entrenchment by a limited number of economic groups capable
of increasing benefits for themselves at the cost of providing new and
more efficient services for the public, and a services structure that often
fails to accommodate all consumers at reasonable costs. 51 Even though
Congress has recoguized that certain regulations are necessary in the
securities and banking industries to protect the public from economic
abuses, Congress and the courts have acknowledged the importance
of preserving competition in the securities industry. 52
Anticompetitive aspects of the securities field were seen in the com-
missions structure that, until 1975, predetermined the rates that small
49. See pp. 1500-02 infra.
50. Brokers and investment companies have complained in recent suits that they are
losing business because of competition with bank-sponsored investment services. See
,1'SE case; supra note 3, at 96,658; Investnent Co. case, supra note 3, at 95,865.
51. House and Senate studies of the securities markets have stressed the value of com-
petition in promoting efficiency among firms serving the public, in lowering the costs
incurred by investors, and in eliminating market distortions that prevent the develop-
ment of a central market system. See SuBcoNI. ox SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COIMsI. ON
BANKIN(,, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doe. No. 93-13, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 44-51 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SENATE SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY]; SUB-
COMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, H.R. Doc. No. 92-1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 141-42
(1972) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY].
52. See note 51 supra; United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372
(1963) (emphasizes that even though banking is a highly regulated industry, competition
should be allowed to operate within the framework of this regulatory scheme); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1963) (discusses the government policy via the
antitrust laws of preserving competitive freedom in the securities industry). The SEC's
belief that there must be competition in the securities field is reflected in its desire to
end fixed commission rates. See note 55 infra.
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investors paid.5 3 Some studies have blamed this lack of competition for
the complacency that brokerage houses have shown in recent years, evi-
denced by an unwillingness to allow commission rates to drop to a
level at which small investors are able to invest and by a failure
to develop innovative programs capable of preventing a rush of in-
vestors away from the market during periods of general market stag-
nation.5 4 The SEC initiated the termination of fixed commission
rates, and on May 1, the national securities exchanges adopted a system
of negotiated commission rates.5 5 Many brokerage houses, tacitly ac-
knowledging that they have been at least partly responsible for their
own present depressed condition, have begun some programs designed
to reintroduce investor-oriented service into the brokerage industry. '
Most brokers, however, have continued to argue against any changes
that might heighten competition by allowing financial institutions to
vie for the investor's dollar.
57
The bank's ability to compete with brokers by offering low-cost
bank-sponsored investment services derives in part from the advan-
tages that accrue to diversified institutions. The banks can, for ex-
ample, often count on customers who are satisfied with existing ser-
vices to provide patronage for new services; they can also realize the
economic gains that derive from a large-scale integration of many ac-
53. Brokerage rates on orders between $3,000 and $300,000 were determined by fixed
commission rates. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11019, [Current Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. f 79,964 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 11019]. The history of fixed
commission rates is reviewed in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11093, [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. IT 80,007 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 11093].
In 1 SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
xxii (1971) [hereinafter cited as IIS REPORT], it was concluded that fixed commissions
fostered anticompetitive practices and impeded the development of a central market
system.
54. See SENATE SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 51, at 44-51; HOUSE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 51, at 141-42.
55. On September 19, 1974, the SEC sent a letter to the presidents of the national
registered securities exchanges proposing that they eliminate all fixed commission rates
by May 1, 1975. Release No. 11019, supra note 53. On October 24, 1974, the SEC proposed
Rule 19b-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit national securities
exchanges from requiring members to charge fixed commission rates, and Rule lOb-22 to
make it unlawful for brokers to participate in arrangements that contemplate fixed
commission rates. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11073, [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. IT 79,991 (1974). Negotiated rates began on May 1, 1975. Cole, Era of Ne-
gotiated Rates Presages Uncertainty, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1975, at 59, col. 6. Because bank-
sponsored investment services will compete with brokers for customers and will do so part-
ly by offering more attractive commission rates, they foster the SEC's goal of competition
for the investor's dollar.
56. The development of plans offering discounts to small investors is evidence of this.
See p. 1481 supra.
57. Brokers' organizations were especially active in raising opposition to the SEC's
proposal to establish competitive commission rates. See, e.g., BNA 1974 SEC. REC. L. REP.
No. 282, at AA-3-4; id. No. 281, at AA-I-2; id. No. 279, at AA-2-3; id. No. 274. at A-2.
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tivities under one roof5S The SEC's Institutional Investor Study Re-
port5l identified the trend toward diversification and combination in
many types of formerly distinct financial enterprises.60 It concluded
that this trend, representing a progressive movement based on econ-
omies of scale and promising lower costs to investors, should be re-
stricted "only on the basis of demonstrated regulatory necessity."'
Banks have capitalized on these factors by offering low-cost invest-
ment services that should be able to compete successfully with brokers
and investment companies for small investors' business. This increase
of competition in the securities markets is likely to aid in developing
a central market system and in promoting a services structure that can
better serve the public.
III. The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services
A. The Standards for Legal Analysis
Within the framework of providing protection for investors and
limiting bank activities to the areas permitted by Congress, regulatory
bodies should embrace a policy of encouraging low-cost, efficient in-
vestment services through competition in the marketplace. If bank-
sponsored investment services violate one or more goals of public
policy-especially the adequate protection of banks as envisaged by the
Glass-Steagall Act or the protection of securities investors as set down
by the federal securities laws-the services should be restricted. Other-
wise, in determining their legality, the courts and the SEC should
be guided by the beneficial effects on small investors and the na-
tion's market system that bank-sponsored investment services seem
to promise.
B. The Glass-Steagall Act
The Banking Act of 1933,02 popularly known as the Glass-Steagall
Act, was a response to the bank failures of the Depression. Section 16
58. 8 IIS REPORT, supra note 53, at xvii-xviii. Besides offering a greater number of
services, banks have responded to their customers' needs by establishing branches in
suburbs and by providing 24-hour automated service. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar.
29, 1971, at 78; Machines Provide 24-Hour Bank Service, id. Jan. 29, 1973, at 74.
59. 8 IIS REPORT, supra note 53.
60. Institutions studied by the Commission included investment advisory complexes,
bank trust departments, insurance companies, offshore funds, and pension benefit plans.
Id. at 13-74.
61. Id. at xviii.
62. Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
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authorized national banks to deal in investment securities only upon
the order and for the account of customers, restricted the underwriting
of securities by national banks, and limited the purchases of invest-
ment securities for a national bank's own account. 3 Section 21, with
certain limited exceptions, prohibited any persons or organizations
involved in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distri-
buting securities from engaging in the commercial banking business. 4
Section 308(a) of the Banking Act of 193505 amended § 16 to make
clear that a national bank's ability to engage in agency dealings ex-
tended to all securities, including stocks, and that the prohibition on
purchasing investment securities referred to purchases for a bank's own
account. 66 Section 303(a) amended § 21(a) of the 1933 Act to empha-
size that § 21(a) did not prohibit banks from engaging in securities
activities to the extent permitted by § 16.07
Nothing in the Glass-Steagall Act itself indicates that bank-sponsored
investment services are illegal. Section 16 states that national banks
can deal in securities to the extent of purchasing and selling them
upon the order and for the account of their customers. Except for
bank advisory services to investment companies, which involve ad-
visory activities that are not discussed by the statute, bank-sponsored
investment services are based on purchases and sales of securities by
'banks for their customers. The statute, therefore, would appear to
grant unlimited authority to banks to act as agents in purchasing and
selling securities.
In order to make an informed decision about the legality of bank-
sponsored investment services, however, it is also important to examine
the circumstances that surrounded enactment of the 1933 Banking Act.
Although Congress, in considering the bills eventually consolidated to
become the Glass-Steagall Act, did not devote specific attention to cus-
tomer purchases by banks,6s the House and Senate reports that ac-
63. Banking Act of 1933 § 16, 48 Stat. 184, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). Section
5(c) of the 1933 Act, 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1970), extends the provisions of § 16 to state mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System.
64. Banking Act of 1933 § 21(a)(1), 48 Stat. 189, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1970).
65. Banking Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 684 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
66. Banking Act of 1935 § 308(a), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). The purpose of the amend-
ment was to make clear that national banks and other member banks could purchase and
sell stock for the accounts of their customers but not for their own accounts. H.R. REP.
No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 742].
67. Banking Act of 1935 § 303(a), 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1970). See H.R. REP'. No. 742, supra
note 66, at 16, which refers to the purpose of the amendment.
68. S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 77];
H.R. REP. No. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 150].
Hearings on S. 4115 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932) [hereinafter cited as 1932 Senate Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 10241 and 11362
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companied those bills described the purpose of § 16 as allowing na-
tional banks to purchase and sell securities for their customers to the
same extent as "heretofore." 69
In the years before the Glass-Steagall Act, courts often allowed banks
to purchase stocks for their customers,70 and by 1930 the practice was
sufficiently standardized for the New York Court of Appeals to give
it judicial notice. 71 Many features of present-day bank-sponsored in-
vestment services existed in these pre-1933 purchases. Banks made di-
rect charges against their customers' accounts in purchasing stock for
them rather than requiring them to make special deposits for the
stock,72 charged service fees for these transactions, 73 and did not re-
quire a customer relationship independent of the agreement to pur-
chase stock.
74
The existence of these earlier practices is a persuasive indication
that the modern services are legal. But it cannot be conclusive; some
aspects of bank-sponsored investment services did not exist before 1934.
No evidence indicates that banks compiled lists of securities for cus-
tomers, made large-scale purchases for many customers at once, or ad-
vertised as extensively as they now do.7 The issue of the legality of
Before the Subcomin. of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932) [hereinafter cited as 1932 House Hearings]; Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71
Before a Subcoinin. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess.,
Pt 7 (1931) [hereinafter cited as 1931 Senate Hearings].
6. S. REP. No. 77, supra note 68, at 16; H.R. REP. No. 150, supra note 68, at 3.
70. See, e.g., Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U.S. 254 (1932) (allowed a bank to purchase bonds
for a customer); Mark v. Westlin, 48 F.2d 609 (D. Minn. 1931) (involved a purchase of
bonds for a bank customer); Dyer v. Broadway Cent. Bank, 252 N.Y. 430, 433, 169 N.E.
635, 636 (1930) (recognized as a matter of common knowledge that many banks purchase
stock for customers).
71. Block v. Pennsylvania Exch. Bank, 253 N.Y. 227, 232, 170 N.E. 900, 901-02 (1930)
(per Cardozo, J.).
72. See, e.g., Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U.S. 254, 259 (1932); McNair v. Davis, 68 F.2d 935,
936 (5th Cir. 1934).
73. See, e.g., Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U.S. 254, 259 (1932); Davis v. McNair, 48 F.2d 494,
495 (5th Cir. 1931).
74. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Clarence Say. Bank, 5 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928)
(customer, not a regular bank depositor, left $2,000 with the bank for the sole purpose of
purchasing bonds through the bank).
75. Similarly, the ambiguity surrounding the force of the Comptroller of the Currency's
early opinions on § 16 leaves some question as to the proper interpretation of the section.
In the years between 1934 and 1936 the Comptroller issued opinions stating that banks
could not make profits on stock purchases for customers, and that banks could purchase
stocks only for existing bank customers where relationship with the bank existed inde-
pendently of the particular transaction in which the bank purchased stock for them. See
20 FED. Rrs. BULL. 609 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 5357 Before the House Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1935); 1 BULL. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENcy No. 2, at 2-3 (1936), cited in Memorandum of the New York Stock Exchange in
Support of Request for a Ruling that Operation of Automatic Investment Service by a
National Bank is Unlawful, Mar. 22, 1974, at 15-16. These opiffions, which probably
were based on the Comptroller's Depression-created fear of allowing any banking practices
that might draw criticism from people who had seen the speculative banking abuses of
the 1920's, are entitled to some weight as contemporaneous interpretations of the Glass-
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bank-sponsored investment services can thus best be approached by
considering whether the services violate other concerns of the Glass-
Steagall Act or jeopardize the goal of adequate protection for investors.
C. The Creation of Securities
In an era of new and expanded meanings for the term "security,"70
it is possible that automatic investment services involve banks in the
creation and distribution of securities-practices prohibited under §§ 16
and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. In their current suit against the
Comptroller of the Currency, the New York Stock Exchange and the
Investment Company Institute have presented this argument. 7 They
contend that, under AIS, monthly deductions from customers' checking
accounts are pooled in commingled accounts during the acquisition
interval before the actual purchase of the stock. Each customer has an
undetermined interest in pooled purchase funds and an interest in an
undetermined number of shares to be purchased which constitutes a
security, "separate and distinct from the stock which the bank will
ultimately purchase under the Plan."7 They also maintain that frac-
tional shares, which result from the purchase of whole shares for a
large number of customers and the receipt by individual customers of
fractional share interests, are likewise securities.70 This creation of
new securities "in the form of interests in commingled accounts and
fractional shares," they conclude, involves the bank in selling, issuing,
and distributing securities in violation of §§ 16 and 21.80
Steagall Act by an administrative agency. See Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioners, 350
U.S. 46, 53 (1955); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1920).
But two considerations diminish the force of the Comptroller's early rulings as a restric-
tion on bank-sponsored investment services, and create more ambiguity about how § 16
should be interpreted. First, the Comptroller of the Currency no longer adheres to these
early opinions. From 1957, the Comptroller has maintained that banks may collect a
service charge on stock purchases. See Bank Automatic Inv. Serv., [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. gf 79,817, at 84,209-10 (Comp. Curr. 1974). Also, recent
rulings by the Comptroller have allowed profit oriented stock purchase plans for customers
that contained no distinction between new and preexisting customers. See id. at 84,205-17;
Investment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. J 79,411 (SEC);
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE. i 79,412 (SEC).
Second, these early opinions conflict with Congress's purpose of allowing bank purchases
for customers to the extent carried on "heretofore," since in the years before 1934 banks
made profits on these purchases and the service was not limited to preexisting customers
who showed interest in things other than the service itself.
76. See Clorman, Condominiums as Securities: A Current Look, 19 N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974);
Note, Securities-Scotch Whiskey Warehouse Receipts-Held to be Securities under the
Securities Act of 1973, 25 MERCER L. REV. 733 (1974); 39 Mo. L. REV. 283 (1974); 26 V,%ND,
L. REV. 874 (1973).
77. See NYSE case, supra note 3, at 96,656-57.
78. Id. at 96,656.
79. Id. at 96,656-57.
80. Id. at 96,657.
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The definition of a security that the courts have thus far formulated,
though still an inchoate, imperfectly articulated concept,81 casts doubt
upon these theories. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,82 found that an invest-
ment contract-Howey's definition of which other courts have used as
their definition of a security83-is "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party."8 4 The requirement of investment "in a common enterprise"
is crucial. Equating common enterprise with the notion of a joint
venture, the courts hold that there must be an actual pooling of in-
vestor funds; if an investment manager, broker, or agent receives funds
from a number of people but does not pool them, there is no common
enterprise among the various investors.sa Thus, in Investment Com-
pany Institute v. Camp,80 a leading recent case on the limits of bank
investment services, the Supreme Court found a common enterprise be-
cause each customer bought a "unit of participation" which represented
an interest in a collective group of assets.8 7 in Milnarik v. M-S Com-
modities, Inc.,8s on the other hand, the court of appeals did not de-
tect a common enterprise in a plan in which various investors, rep-
resented by a common agent who had discretion to invest their funds,
were not joint participants in the same investment enterprise.8 9
The Supreme Court has established an important principle for ap-
plying the Howey test: "[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of
the word 'security' . . . form should be disregarded for substance and
the emphasis should be on economic reality."90 It seems clear under
this principle that AIS does not involve an undetermined interest in
pooled purchase funds or an interest in an undetermined number of
shares to be purchased that meets Howey's common enterprise cri-
81. See Student Symposium-Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security: Some
Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 95, 96 (1974).
82. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
83. See, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 642
(D.D.C. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
401 U.S. 617 (1971); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1965).
84. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
85. See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Snpp. 1066, 1067-69 (M.D.
Pa. 1972), afj'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973); Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59
F.R.D. 129, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
86. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
87. See Bank Automatic Inv. Serv., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RrP.
79,817, at 84,212 (Comp. Curr. 1974).
88. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
89. Id. at 276-77.
90. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
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terion. The common enterprise in Camp involved an undetermined
interest in pooled funds that lasted from the time of investment to
sale of the interest, when the participant would finally sever his in-
terest from the common pool.91 In AIS, however, except for a short
acquisition interval, each customer has an individual, separate owner-
ship of a definite amount of stock; his resources are not pooled with
those of his fellow investors. 92 While the acquisition interval does in-
volve a brief combination of investors' funds and an uncertainty over
the exact number of shares which each customer will receive when
the purchase is consummated, this does not entail the type of "sub-
stance" or "economic reality" that the Howey test envisions. The acqui-
sition interval is a bookkeeping device designed to give customers
lower brokerage rates through large-scale purchases. 93 It does not rep-
resent a common enterprise that depends on the permanent pooling
of funds for investment success.
Fractional shares do in a sense resemble the customer's interests in
pooled funds present in Camp, 4 and perhaps under a technical con-
ceptual approach such fractional interests would be deemed securities.
But to strike down investment services simply on the basis of a minor
bookkeeping convenience 9a that is hardly the heart of the plan, would
be to exalt form over "substance" and "economic reality." The essence
of the plan remains the purchase of whole shares for individual ac-
counts. Moreover, little investor protection would be gained if the
services are struck down on this rather technical ground,9 since hence-
forth AIS plans could still be offered with only a superficial change-
the bank would have to reimburse to customers any sums insufficient
to buy whole shares for individual accounts. The investor would thus
91. See 401 U.S. 617, 622-25 (1971).
92. See Release No. 5491, supra note 2, at 84,073; Investment Data Corp., [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RES'. ir 79,411, at 83,183-84 (SEC).
93. See Bank Automatic Inv. Serv., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. Rr,.
ff 79,817, at 84,212 (Comp. Curt. 1974).
94. In Camp, a customer's investment was added to a fund comprised of other in-
vestments, and the customer received a certificate that expressed his proportionate interest
in the fund's assets. See 401 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1970). His unit of participation, which did
not entail the type of individual ownership of stock found in AIS but rather comprised
an interest in a joint enterprise that resembled a mutual fund, was the essence of the
collective investment fund. See id.
95. See Investment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 79,411,
at 83,183 (SEC).
96. As a policy matter, the only sound reason for finding that an enterprise creates a
security is to provide investor protection by subjecting the enterprise to the federal
securities laws. If banking regulations already provide the customers of bank-sponsored
investment services with adequate investor protection-as this Note argues they do-the
public policy rationale for finding the creation of a security is undercut.
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lose the convenience of fractional shares but gain little in substantive
protection.07
D. Conflicts of Interest
In Investment Company Institute v. Camp,98 the Court found that
a bank-operated pooled investment fund violated the Glass-Steagall
Act because such a fund gave rise to several potential conflicts of in-
terest for commercial banks-abuses which Congress had intended to
prohibit.99 Critics of bank-sponsored investment services have argued
that these abuses, found in banking practices of the 1920's and in the
collective investment fund in Camp, are also found in present bank-
sponsored investment services, making them illegal under the Glass-
Steagall Act.100
Several considerations provide a framework for studying this issue.
First, a variety of conflicts of interest can be found in banks, financial
institutions, and any other institutions that are responsible for servicing
more than one customer or that perform at least two functions at the
same time. Since conflicts of interest can be conjured up in all aspects
of human endeavor, the mere invocation of the unfavorable connota-
tions that attach to this phrase should not constitute a sufficient reason
for prohibiting the activity that creates the conflict.
Second, contrived theories that seek to show how a bank or other
institution might, under a highly unlikely set of circumstances, engage
in illegal or otherwise undesirable activities because of a certain con-
flict of interest have generally not been accepted by the courts as ade-
quate reasons for imposing liability or prohibiting the underlying ac-
tivity. The emphasis, instead, has been on situations where abuses
actually exist or are almost certain.101
97. The analysis used for AIS can also show that other bank-sponsored investment
services do not create securities. DRP, like AIS, pools customer's funds only during the
acquisition interval; each customer receives an individual ownership interest in the
corporation. Similarly, IPMS involves individual ownership of shares of stock. Since the
operation of VIP in this respect is identical to AIS, it does not appear that VIP creates
new securities. For investment advisory activities, the issue of the creation of a security is
somewhat different, involving the question of whether the relationship between a bank
adviser and an investment company is so close that the bank is in effect issuing and
distributing the investment company's securities in violation of §§ 16 and 21. See Invest-
ment Co. case, supra note 3, at 95,864. The Court's principle of looking at the substance
of the relationship suggests that unless the bank clearly controls the investment company,
the two institutions should not be viewed as one unit for purposes of determining whether
the bank, rather than the investment company, is really issuing the securities.
98. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
99. See id. at 630-38.
100. See NYSE case, supra note 3, at 96,655-56.
101. See, e.g., Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 603 (2d Cir. 1954);
Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 196 F.2d 668, 675 (2d Cir. 1952); York v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
143 F.2d 503, 514 (2d Cir. 1944).
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A third factor to be considered is that the public welfare is not al-
ways best served by prohibiting an activity, even if the conflict of in-
terest that it creates is relatively serious. The marginal gains achieved
by prohibiting a conflict of interest often are less than the costs to
society of losing a valuable service.10 2 Congress and regulatory agencies
have recognized that it is sometimes better to allow a valuable service
riddled with conflicts to exist and to impose preventive rules on it
than to prohibit it and run the risk of losing the service's benefits.0 3
Given this method of approaching conflicts of interest, it is suggested
that bank-sponsored investment services should not be,found" illegal
under Camp's interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act unless they both
involve existing or likely abuses that outweigh their advantageous ef-
fects on small investors and the capital market and are not currently
subject to regulation.
One of the conflicts of interest found in Camp consisted in the un-
sound loans that 1920's banks often made to corporations in which
the bank's affiliates had invested.10 4 By analogy, a bank with a pro-
motional interest in an investment program might make unsound loans
to corporations in which its customers had invested in order to attract
new customers to stocks that were growing in value because of un-
limited loans from the bank. However, banks in the 1970's do not
have the same promotional interest in making unsound loans as did
the 1920's banks. The latter had affiliates with investments in specula-
tive stocks, and could benefit financially if these companies grew
through access to investment funds. Through its affiliate, the bank
could make underwriting commissions and profits from high market
prices sustained by corporate loans.' 0 5 In bank-sponsored investment
services, though, it is not reasonable for banks to risk discovery of,
and punishment for, such unsound corporate loans by the Federal Re-
102. See Manning, The Purity Potlatch: An Essay on Conflicts of Interests, Amcrican
Government, and Moral Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239, 248 (1964).
103. In 1936, for example, the SEC acknowledged that "the combination of the broker
and dealer functions in the same individual or firm involves a conflict of interest which
is provocative of abuse of the fiduciary relationship inherent in the brokerage function."
SEC, REPORT ON THE FEAsImLITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF TIE
FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER 109 (1936). Yet the SEC realized that broker-dealers
performed valuable functions. Id. at 24-25, 41-42, 98-108. It therefore recommended
regulation, not prohibition, id. at 109-14, and today the conflicts of interest created by
the dual role of broker-dealers have been handled by imposing suitability and anti-
churning rules. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 15b10-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3;
Rule 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1974).
104. See 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971).
105. See 1931 Senate Hearings, supra note 68, at 1063-66; 75 CONG. REr. 9912 (1932)
(remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
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serve Board. 00 The bank would be making the apparently irrational
decision to make an unsound loan, which it might never recover,
solely for the comparatively insignificant increment in commission
charges from new investment services customers. Congress, moreover,
had much data before it in passing the 1933 legislation showing that
banks actually did make large, unsound loans to their affiliates. 0 A
recent study by the SEC, however, concluded that no significant rela-
tionship existed between loans by a bank's commercial department and
holdings by its trust department, 108 and it is the trust department which
is responsible for bank-sponsored investment services.
Camp found that Congress had perceived as a second conflict of in.
terest "that when commercial banks were subject to the promotional
demands of investment banking, they might be tempted to make loans
to customers with the expectation that the loan would facilitate the
purchase of stocks and securities."'100 There is the possibility that
despite the existence of margin requirements intended to prevent un-
sound loans,"10 of bank agencies that examine bank records for evi-
dence of speculative loans,"" and of punishment imposed on banks
by the Federal Reserve Board for making these loans, 21 2 banks may
make unsound loans to individuals in order to induce them to par-
ticipate in bank-sponsored investment services. But, as in the case of
unsound loans to corporations, a bank would probably not be inclined
to make a loan to a customer simply to enable the customer to par-
ticipate in the service, knowing all along that the money would be
invested in a failing company or that the customer's financial condi-
tion was such that he could never repay the loan. The bank would
not risk its own funds solely to gain a small commission from increased
participation in its services.
As a third conflict of interest that concerned Congress, Camp cited
"the plain conflict between the promotional interest of the investment
banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render disin-
106. 12 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) allows the Federal Reserve Board to suspend a member
bank that is making speculative use of its credit from the credit facilities of the Federal
Reserve System. Federal reserve banks are instructed to examine the lending patterns of
member banks, and to report speculative lending practices to the Federal Reserve Board.
107. Congress recognized that the failure of the Bank of the United States was due to
unsound loans to its affiliates. 1931 Senate Hearings, supra note 68, at 1017. Other banks
made huge loans to their affiliates, id. at 1018, 1065, and evidence existed that at least
one large New York bank had relieved its affiliate of excess holdings by purchasing
securities from it, id. at 1064.
108. 8 IIS REPORT, supra note 53, at 38.
109. 401 U.S. 617, 632 (1971).
110. See 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1974).
111. See note 106 supra.
112. Id.
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terested investment advice. ' ' 13 By trying to add new customers to its
investment programs, banks may engage in biased investment advice
because they would get commissions that increased with the total pur-
chase of stock.'" However, this "bias" exists whenever one attempts to
sell services to another person, and all sellers can be expected to give
overly optimistic accounts of their products. The benefit of the ser-
vices would appear to outweigh whatever harm may result from the
banks' attempt to promote their services. Only if it were shown that
a bank's interest in promoting its services went substantially beyond
its interest in increased commissions-as, for example, where the bank
was advising investments in a failing company that it had previously
lent money to-would a serious abuse be presented. 11
113. 401 U.S. 617, 633 (1971).
114. Any temptation to abuse inherent in bank-sponsored investment services is
dramatically less than the temptation possible in Camp. Under AIS, VIP, and DRP, the
bank stands to gain only through its one-time commission charge, levied at the time of
purchase. In Camp, the bank operating and advising a collective investment fund received
for its services, each year, one-eighth of one percent of the average of the net asset value
of the fund. Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 631 (D.D.C. 1967).
The fund's value, in turn, was determined by the value of the stocks in which it had in-
vested. See id. at 627-31. Thus, the bank had a strong interest in ensuring that these stocks
increased in value, an interest far more likely to induce a bank to make unsound loans to
corporations or to give biased investment advice, than is an interest only in a purchase
commission.
115. Three other conflicts of interest, not discussed in Camp, deserve analysis. One
potential abuse is that the bank offering AIS will take advantage of the acquisition
interval or "float"-the time between the withdrawal of funds from the participants' ac-
counts and the purchase of securities with these funds-by prolonging the acquisition in-
terval so it can use the uninvested cash for its own purposes. See Investment Data Corp.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,411, at 83,183 (SEC). The Comptroller's
Regulation 9 provides that funds held by a bank awaiting investment "shall not be held
uninvested or undistributed any longer than is reasonable for the proper management of
the account." 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(b) (1974). Moreover, examiners look for violations of this
requirement. See 4 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. J 59,302, at 37,149-50 (1969). Another of
the Comptroller's rules prohibits banks from using these funds in a self-dealing manner.
12 C.F.R. § 9.12 (1974).
A second potential conflict of interest lies in the bank's role in handling multiple
clients. Conflict is possible in situations in which, for example, the bank advises its large
trust accounts to sell a particular stock, but also advises its IPMS customers to buy it.
Each purchase or sale for one account would increase or decrease the price at which the
transaction' would take place for the other accounts. This conflict, however, exists for all
investment advisers, who give different advice to different customers based upon their
individual needs, and could probably be eliminated only by prohibiting advisers from
working for more than one customer-an obviously impractical solution.
A third conflict involves misuse of inside information. A bank can, theoretically, use
inside information on the stock market acquired from its commercial banking depart-
ment to provide its investment customers with valuable advice. This problem is not
unique to banks offering the services since brokerage firms that also underwrite have
access to inside information. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). The solution in these contexts has been regulation, not
prohibition of the underlying activity, through application of Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15b10-5 (1974), which forbids "a person having access to material nonpublic corporate
information to trade upon or transmit such information under circumstances where it is
foreseeable that it will or might be traded upon and a purchase or sale is in fact
executed." SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). This rule applies
to banks. See Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
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E. Comparable Regulation
The banks' exemptions from certain provisions of the federal se-
curities laws"116 have led to the argument that banks do not provide
investors who participate in bank-sponsored investment services with
protection comparable to that provided by brokers under the federal
securities laws." 7 If correct, this contention suggests that the services
should be subject to complete SEC jurisdiction. But if it can be shown
that a bank regulatory structure paralleling important features of the
federal securities laws exists and is enforced by banking agencies that
are especially adept at handling banking problems, and that wherever
shortcomings in banking rules or enforcement exist, banking agencies
are capable of correcting them,"18 SEC regulation would be unneces-
sary."19
Examination of books and records. Pursuant to its power to exam-
ine the records of brokers, 20 the SEC requires brokers to make
records of all securities transactions, 21 to preserve these records for at
least six years, 22 and to make quarterly security counts of all securi-
ties held or in transfer. 23 There are also provisions for annual reports
396 U.S. 1003 (1970). Another regulatory solution has been the establishment of a
"Chinese Wall" to prevent the interchange of material confidential information between
the commercial banking and trust departments. See Herman & Safanda, The Commercial
Bank Trust Department and the 'Wall,' 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 21 (1972).
Though the effective enforcement of these rules undoubtedly poses many problems, the
alternative approach-the complete divorce of trust departments from commercial bank-
ing-would also entail administrative difficulties, and, more importantly, might deprive
the public of the beneficial functions performed by trust departments, since these de-
partments might not be able to survive as separate entities. See Lybecker, Regulation of
Trust Department Investment Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 977, 1001-02 (1973).
116. With respect to the issue of bank-sponsored investment services, the principal
exemptions are the banks' exclusions from the definition of the terms "broker" and
"dealer," Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 3(a)(4), 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4), 78c(a)(5)
(1970), and from the definition of the term "investment adviser," Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, § 202(a)(ll)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll)(A) (1970). The exclusions exempt banks
from provisions of the securities laws governing the conduct of brokers, dealers, and in-
vestment advisers.
117. See NYSE case, supra note 3, at 96,657-58.
118. Lybecker has suggested that banking agencies themselves are capable of correcting
problems in the regulation of bank trust department investment activities, and that new
legislation is unnecessary. See Lybecker, supra note 115, at 977-97, 1001-02.
119. The force of this comparison of regulatory schemes must, initially, be tempered
by two caveats: first, although the federal securities laws are used as a standard against
which to compare banking regulations, the securities laws themselves are not perfect and
are not always properly enforced. The SEC's regulation of the New York Stock Exchange,
for example, has been subject to criticism. See Note, Informal Bargaining Process: An
Anal$ysis of the SEC's Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 811 (1971).
Second, the SEC itself has recognized that regulation need not be duplicated simply to
achieve symmetry. See BNA 1974 SEc. REG. L. REP. No. 268, at A-7. Thus, the goal is not
to ensure that brokers and banks are subject to identical rules but to guarantee that
investors receive comparable protection from both regulatory systems.
120. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
121. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1974).
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 17a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (1974).
123. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 17a-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-13 (1974).
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of the financial condition of brokerage firms. 24 The reports include
information about money borrowed by the brokerage firm, its invest-
ments, and customers' security accounts. 12 These regulations ensure
that all customers' securities are accounted for, that the brokerage firm
is in sound financial condition, and that the SEC has advance warning
of potential problems. The SEC has enforced these rules by suspending
brokers or revoking their registrations for failure to file timely and
accurate reports or for filing misleading information. 20
Under the Banking Act, the Comptroller of the Currency is required
to make at least two examinations every three years of "all the affairs"
of national banks, and may make more frequent examinations if neces-
sary.127 In the sense that these examinations have the primary goal
of ensuring that the bank is in sound financial condition,12s they re-
semble the reports of financial condition that brokerage firms make
to the SEC. A large team of bank examiners makes a thorough, unan-
nounced inspection of the bank's loans and collateral.1 2 , If the ex-
aminers find evidence of too many bad loans, the Comptroller may
require the bank to make weekly reports to it, the Comptroller's ex-
aminers may be permanently stationed at the bank to supervise its
day-to-day activities, or the Comptroller may require the more serious
remedies of additional capital or a change in bank management."3
Banks, like brokers, are required to file annual reports of financial
condition detailing their assets and liabilities.' 31 These reports are then
published in newspapers for -public inspection.13 2 Failure to make a
report is punishable by a fine of $100 for each day that the bank de-
lays making the report. 133
A separate set of regulations promulgated by the Comptroller is
designed to protect customers' funds and securities held in bank trust
departments, which are responsible for the administration of bank-
sponsored investment services. The rules require a bank to keep its
records of these accounts separate from other records of the bank;
34
to invest funds within a reasonable period of time;135 to use funds
awaiting investment in its commercial department only if adequate
124. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1974).
125. See 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 33,921-38, at 22,801-14 (SEC 1974).
126. See 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 26,171, at 19,233-50 (1973).
127. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1970).
128. See M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 375 (1974); Lybecker, supra note 115, at 978.
129. M. MAYER, supra note 128, at 368.
130. Id. at 369.
131. 12 U.S.C. §§ 161(a), 1827(a) (1970).
132. 12 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1970).
133. 12 U.S.C. § 164 (1970).
134. 12 C.F.R. § 9.8 (1974).
135. 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(a) (1974)..
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collateral is set aside;1 30 to keep the investments of each account
separate from the bank's assets;' 37 and to file an annual report with
the Comptroller of the Currency listing the securities held by each ac-
count. 1 Like the regulations governing brokers, they are intended
to guarantee that each customer's securities are accounted for and
properly handled. The Comptroller may proceed in a variety of ways
against banks that violate these requirements. 39
Only a detailed statistical study could answer the question of whether
the examination and reporting requirements of one agency protect in-
vestors better than those of the other agency. It is clear that both bank-
ing and securities agencies have a similar regulatory and enforcement
structure which envisions inspections that are similar in frequency,
scope, and goals. One shortcoming of the banking system is that en-
forcement proceedings are not as well publicized as those of the SEC,
which announces disciplinary actions relating even to minor infrac-
tions such as failure to file reports on time. This inadequacy, how-
ever, could easily be corrected. The Comptroller only would need to
decide to publicize more widely his enforcement proceedings. Like-
wise, even critics of the responses of bank regulators to other bank
trust department investment practices have recognized that bank ex-
aminers have the ability to formulate solutions to such problems, and
that legislation subjecting trust departments to examination by other
regulatory agencies is unneeded. 140
Protection against insolvency. Should insolvency occur, investors re-
ceive comparable protection whether they engage brokers or banks.
Pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act, a customer's cash
held by brokers is insured to $20,000, and his securities are insured
to 550,000.'41 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures bank
deposits to $40,000.142 Temporarily held funds that have been deducted
from a customer's account for use under any of the services constitute
deposits, and are covered by FDIC.143 Although FDIC does not insure
136. 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(b) (1974).
137. 12 C.F.R. § 9.13(a) (1974).
138. 12 C.F.R. § 9.102 (1974).
139. The Banking Act empowers the Comptroller to initiate proceedings for cease-and-
desist orders, for termination of status as an insured bank, and for the removal of officers,
against banks that it believes are violating banking regulations or engaging in unsound
practices. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1970). These enforcement proceedings resemble those used by
the SEC.
140. See Lybecker, supra note 115.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f)(l) (1970).
142. 88 Stat. 1500, § 102(a)(3) (1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1970).
143. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(3). In addition, a bank may not deposit an investor's funds
in other accounts in the bank prior to investment unless adequate security is set aside or
unless the funds are covered by FDIC insurance. 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(b) (1974).
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securities held by banks for customers, the reason that compelled this
interim coverage rule for brokers is not applicable to banking prac-
tices. Brokers can commingle and otherwise use their customers' funds
for their own purposes, 14 with the consequent prior lien by the bro-
kers' creditors on securities purchased with the customers' funds.145
Banks, however, must segregate all securities held for the services'
customers from the assets of the bank, and must keep separate ac-
counts for these securities. 40 Another provision, which gives customers'
holdings priority in any insolvency proceedings,1 47 minimizes the risk
of loss which the customers face in the event of insolvency. This re-
quirement has been enforced in actual insolvency proceedings. 48
The suitability rule. The suitability rule provides that a broker
or dealer who recommends to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange
of any security must have reasonable grounds to believe that the recom-
mendation is not unsuitable for the customer on the basis of informa-
tion furnished by the customer after reasonable inquiry concerning
his investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any other
information known by broker or dealer. 149 The broker-dealer is in
violation of the suitability requirement if he does not make a thorough
examination of the customer's financial situation'0 0 or advises a client
to assume risks out of proportion to his financial resources.Y5' This
requirement, which does not apply to banks because of their exemp-
tion from the Exchange Act's definition of "broker,"'1 2 protects in-
vestors, who are, in theory at least, assured that they are not commit-
ting egregiously unwise investment decisions.
With respect to dividend reinvestment plans, which involve only a
mechanical reinvestment of a customer's dividends into a stock that
144. Brokers may use for their own purposes funds arising out of a free credit balance
carried on for a customer if adequate notice is given. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Rule 15c3-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-2 (1974). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 15c2-1,
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-1 (1974), allows brokers to hypothecate a customer's securities with
other customers' securities if notice is first given.
145. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 15c2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-1 (1974).
146. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(c) (1970).
147. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(e) (1970).
148. See, e.g., Bobbitt v. Oxford Nat'l Bank, 208 N.C. 460, 181 S.E. 251 (1935). The
success of FDIC insurance in preventing the loss of depositors' money is discussed in M.
MAYER, supra note 128, at 372-73.
149. All brokers and dealers are subject to a suitability requirement under at least one
of the following regulations: Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 15b10-3, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15b10-3 (1974); NYSE, Rule 405, 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE 2405 (1975); CCH NASD
MANUAL 2152, art. III (National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice),
§ 2 (1969); AMEX, Rule 411, 2 CCH A.M.E.X. GUIDE ff 9431 (1970).
150. Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 137-38 (1960).
151. See, e.g., Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69
Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968); Philips & Co. and Gerald G. Bernheimer, 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956).
152. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1970).
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he already owns, the suitability rule should not apply. The bank can-
not be said either to select or recommend any stock.
AIS involves different considerations. Banks in their AIS contracts
customarily state that they are not recommending the purchase of any
stock, that they make no representation about the suitability of an in-
vestment for a particular individual, and that each participant should
make an independent investigation into the merits of each stock. 153
Relying upon these disclaimers, the Comptroller has announced that
AIS does not give rise to a traditional fiduciary relationship, and that
the suitability rule therefore is inapplicable. 54 The basis for this posi-
tion is that because AIS involves a mechanical selection of the 25
largest stocks on Standard & Poor's Index, from which the customer
selects his stocks without advice from the bank, the bank is not ad-
vising the customer on the investment's suitability. 155
But if the congressional policy of the Exchange Act is to ensure that
a customer will not be misled into buying a stock that is unsuitable
for him, it seems reasonable to subject AIS to some form of suitability
requirement. Even though the list of stocks is arbitrarily selected and
despite the presence on the list of well known stocks that many small
investors normally buy, the very process of delineating a group of
stocks is an act of "holding out" to the customer that each stock is
suitable for him. The small investor will understandably believe that
most or all of the stocks on the list are suitable investments, even
though in reality the 25 largest stocks do not necessarily constitute
the 25 most desirable purchases. Public policy is ill-served by a plan
which purports to be a way to attract the small investor to the market
but which disclaims all responsibility for his investments.
Because of the unique features of automatic investment plans, the
requirements of suitability could be imposed on banks by the Comp-
troller of the Currency without resort to the Exchange Act.0 0 The
relatively stable nature of the largest 25 stocks, as compared with many
of the more speculative stocks that the suitability rule has traditionally
covered, would not require a costly inspection of the stock and the
153. Investment Data Corporation emphasized these features in its request for a no-
action letter on the validity of automatic investment services. Investment Data Corp.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 79,411, at 83,182-85 (SEC).
154. Bank Automatic Inv. Serv., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
79,817, at 84,215 (Comp. Curr. 1974).
155. Id.
156. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) (1970) grants to the Comptroller the authority to issue this type
of regulation. Pursuant to this authority, the Comptroller has a regulation similar to
the suitability rule. See 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(a)(2) (1974). It is not currently applied to AIS. See
Bank Automatic Inv. Serv., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. f 79,817, at
84,215 (Comp. Curr. 1974).
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customer's financial situation on the part of the bank. But if AIS
eventually expands to include more speculative stocks, the Comp-
troller should require the more detailed inspection that these securi-
ties require. A requirement by the Comptroller that banks must have
their customers complete information sheets detailing their financial
and investment objectives would also help the banks satisfy the suit-
ability rule that brokers are subject to. Finally, if banks are allowed
to advertise the advantages of their programs, they should also have
to explain the possible disadvantages of selecting stocks from a nar-
row list of 25 or 30 securities. Such a rule might encourage banks to
diversify their lists of offered stocks.
Banks offering individual portfolio management services are already
subject to regulations that resemble the suitability requirements of the
federal securities laws, and that provide a model for developing suit-
ability rules for other bank-sponsored investment services. Section
9.7(a)(2) of Regulation 9, promulgated by the Comptroller, requires
a bank to make a prompt review of a customer's assets when an ac-
count is accepted and to perform periodic examinations of the ac-
count "to determine the advisability of retaining or disposing of such
assets.' ' 15r The Comptroller's examiners check for violations of these
requirements,las and have the same options available to them for pun-
ishing violations as they have under other examination provisions. 15
Regulations governing bank and nonbank advisers to investment
companies. The Investment Company Act of 1940100 subjects banks
acting as investment advisers to investment companies to the same
regulations as nonbank advisers, sirnce the Act's definition of "invest-
ment adviser" does not exclude banks."" Thus, bank and nonbank
advisers are subject to the same regulations in areas such as the quali-
fications of investment advisers 62 and the preservation of records.'' 3
157. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(a)(2) (1974). The initial review must elicit the same information
from the customer that the broker must obtain; namely, purpose of the account, income
data, and amounts of other investments. See 4 CCH FEn. BANKING L. Rr. ff 59,295, at
37,142 (1969).
158. See 4 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. rl 59,295, at 37,142 (1969).
159. See p. 1499 supra.
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970).
161. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(20), 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(20) (1970).
162. Section 9(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a) (1970),
forbids any person who has been convicted of certain kinds of securities laws violations
from serving as an investment adviser. Section 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1970), empowers
the SEC to prohibit a person engaging in securities laws violations from further serving as
an investment adviser. Section 2(28), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(28) (1970), defines "person" as a
"natural person or a company."
163. Section 31 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (1970), re-
quires investment advisers to preserve accounts and records of their activities for SEC
inspection.
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The Investment Advisers Act of 1940,10 however, excludes banks
from the definition of "investment adviser" for purposes of the Act.16
Nonetheless, the three key provisions of this Act are all paralleled by
other restrictions which do apply to banks.06 Section 203 requires ad-
visers to register with the SEC and to file information about their quali-
fications and conduct. 07 The SEC may suspend advisers who have en-
gaged in securities laws violations.16 8 Similar restrictions on banks
are found in the Investment Company Act' 69 and the Banking Act.170
Second, the Investment Advisers Act requires advisers to maintain
records available for SEC inspection. 17' Similar duties are imposed on
bank advisers by the Investment Company Act 72 and the Comptrol-
ler's Regulations. 173 Third, the Investment Advisers Act prohibits ad-
visers from engaging in manipulative or fraudulent practices. 174 The
SEC brings court actions against persons that it suspects have violated
this provision. 7 5 Investment advisers have had their registrations re-
voked for engaging in fraudulent practices such as misleading adver-
tisements, false statements about material facts concerning the value
of certain corporations, and failure to disclose conflicts of interest. 7 6
This provision is similar to the antifraud section of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, which applies to banks.' 77 A person in violation
of any provision of this Act can be fined or imprisoned. 178 Courts
have found fraudulent and manipulative practices in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act in a wide range of situations involving non-
disclosure or misleading disclosure of information, distribution man-
ipulations, and self-dealing. 170
Results of the comparison. To a large extent, there exists a set of
164. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970).
165. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1970).
166. Section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970), is a
fourth significant provision, not important in the context of bank-sponsored investment
services.
167. Investment Advisors Act of 1940 § 203(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (1970).
168. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1970).
169. See note 162 supra.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g) (1970) empowers banking agencies to expel from office bank
officers and directors convicted of felonies.
171. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1970).
172. See note 163 supra.
173. 12 C.F.R. § 9.8 (1974) requires national banks exercising fiduciary powers to main-
tain books and records for inspection by the Comptroller of the Currency.
174. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970).
175. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970).
176. See 4 CCH Fra. SEc. L. REP. it 56,361-96, at 44,090-98 (1974).
177. See Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970) (a bank that participated in a fraudulent scheme to manipulate securities
was within the "any person" clause of § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule lOb-5).
178. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).
179. See 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. ff 22,781-841, at 16,657-910 (1973).
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enforced banking regulations that provides bank-sponsored investment
services customers with protection comparable to that given by the
federal securities laws to investors using brokers. Where shortcomings
exist, the Comptroller of the Currency has the present statutory ca-
pacity to enact needed regulAtions and to enforce existing require-
ments with greater vigor. Subjecting banks to a double set of regula-
tions would undoubtedly raise their costs in supplying bank-sponsored
investment services; this would conflict with the goal of providing ade-
quate investor protection at the least possible cost.
Conclusion
Bank-sponsored investment services can attract small investors to
the market, increase the amount of capital available to corporations,
and help correct the erosion of competition in the securities industry.
The services are legal under the Glass-Steagall Act. There is no need
for the SEC to regulate these services because investors using banks
and brokers already are protected almost comparably, and the Comp-
troller of the Currency can correct any problems that may exist in
the bank regulatory scheme.
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